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Here I revisit a critical
juncture of the formation of
modern humanitarianism, the
late 18th-century movement
to abolish the British slave
trade, through the lens of a
prevailing paradigm that has
explained it as deriving from
the logic of capitalist devel-
opment. A closer look at this
early phase of abolitionism
within its historical context
I conclude by drawing out the larger impli-
cations of this historical complexity for the study
of humanitarianism at large. The intricate causal
interconnections between early abolitionism urges
us to be more atentive to the manifold forms
of humanitarian practice and to situate them
in a proper causal context instead of assuming
that humanitarianism is an epiphenomenal man-
ifestation of alegedly deeper structural forces,
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such as the economy. Reversing this assumption
and directing atention to the casual inﬂuence
of humanitarianism on other areas of social life
opens  up  a  promising





What was abolitionism and
why is it a landmark in
the trajectory of  modern
humanitarianism   (Barnet
2011)? Consisting of three
public campaigns from 1788 onwards and resulting
in the abolition of the trade in 1807, abolition was
the ﬁrst highly visible, enduring and inﬂuential
coupling of a humanitarian norm, the norm against
slavery, with persistent institutions and practices
(Brown 2006; Drescher 1987; Jennings 1997; Old-
ﬁeld 1995). British abolitionism also exercised a
formative inﬂuence on the complex phenomenon of
humanitarianism. It generated recurent campaigns
against various slaveries in British colonies and
then elsewhere; it became an important interna-
tional “brand” of humanitarianism, as constituen-
cies outside of Britain mobilised for the abolition
of “their” slaveries; there is an almost unbroken
continuity between the ﬁrst London Abolition com-
mitee and today’s Antislavery International; and
abolitionism’s rhetoric and organizational models
were adopted widely by subsequent social move-
ments, from the campaign against “factory slavery”
eveals the implausibility of
the economy as the most
salient explanatory factor for the origin and success
of the abolitionist project. Instead, this project
emerged at the interstices of a complex causal
entanglement between the areas of economic and
moral action.
in Yorkshire to the women’s movement. More
generaly, the ﬁrst abolitionist movement was able
to gradualy articulate a strict prohibitive moral
regime against the slave trade and slavery and to
force states, starting with the British state, and then
international organisations to accept this regime.
In short, abolitionism of the 1780s was the sign
of an important historical change, heralding the
arival of humanitarianism as we know it. In many
ways, then, the proper understanding of the origins
of modern humanitarianism depends on a proper
understanding of the origins of these ﬁrst abolition-
ist campaigns in the 1780s.
The idea that the primary cause for aboli-
tionism was the capitalist transformation of the
economy was enshrined in a series of canonical
works initiated by Eric Wiliams’s (1944)Capi-
talism and Slavery. Relying on a selective inter-
pretation of the evidence, Wiliams explained the
abolition of British colonial slavery in orthodox
Marxist terms, arguing that by the time of its
abolition in the 1830s it had become a losing
proposition for British capitalists. More careful
examination of the economics of slavery and the
slave trade showed, however, that neither was as
inherently unproﬁtable nor as disadvantageous as
to lead to its own abolition (Drescher 2010; Eltis
1987). As more detailed work in the economy of
slavery and the slave trade made it increasingly
clear that the abolition was impossible to explain
on the grounds of economic rationality, scholars
shifted their atention instead to non-economic yet
economicaly determined factors that they thought
were the important causal connection between the
capitalist “base” and the abolitionist “superstruc-
ture” (Temperley 1977). For David Brion Davis
([1975] 1999) a capitalist ideological hegemony
that was disturbed by ancient enslavement yet felt
comfortable with Marx’s “wage slavery” was that
missing link. In another intervention in the debate,
Thomas Haskel (1985) drew atention away from
the functional ﬁt between capitalism and oppression
techniques to argue instead that what matered
was the extensive scale of capitalist economic trans-
actions. Expanding markets required more sophis-
ticated cognitive reckoning to account for complex
economic transactions, according to Haskel, and
humanitarian relating to distant others started to
happen when people were able to transfer these
cognitive skils to non-economic areas. Hence the
origin of the moral concerns with colonial slaves.
What unites this historiographic tradition is an
adherence to the Marxist postulate of the incompat-
ibility of alegedly economicaly irational slavery
with the capitalist mode of production. On an
even deeper level, the source of this tradition is
Marx’s insistence on the primary importance of
relations of production as the ultimate causal factor
in social dynamics. In Marx’s model, no genuine
and positive social change in the 19thcentury was
possible without the total transformation of a prole-
tarian revolution, the cyclical equivalent of earlier
“feudal” and “bourgeois” revolutions. Therefore,
the activity of “reformers” and “humanitarians”
was nothing more than the lukewarm efort of
the bourgeois class to ensure its dominance by
applying cosmetic remedies to capitalism’s most
severe social problems. In regard to abolitionism
and antislavery, this Marxist disparagement of sub-
revolutionary reform expressed itself in exposing
such movements as subservient to and dictated by
the logic of capitalism. In the Marxist scheme,
each productive system had its own coresponding
system of oppression. Thus capitalism replaced the
“ancient” and “medieval” oppressions of slavery
and serfdom with the “modern” oppression of
“wage slavery” in capitalist factories (Tucker 1978,
p. 713,169). If abolitionism sought the ending of
slavery and the slave trade, it was because these
institutions were incompatible with the logic of the
new capitalist order.
That the ﬁrst abolition of the slave trade (if
we discount the Danish abolition of its slave trade
in anticipation of the impending British one) and
then of slavery occured precisely in the Anglo-
American world, the quintessential home of modern
capitalism, strengthened the intuitive plausibility
of this postulate. On the other hand, economic
historians did not ﬁnd evidence that slavery was
inherently incompatible with capitalism. Thus his-
torians were faced with a discrepancy: abolition did
happen in the most developed capitalist contexts yet
it was not clear that it was economic development
that necessitated the abolition of slavery, because
slavery was wel integrated with the new capital-
ist order before its abolition. Scholars sought to
resolve the tension between these two incompatible
circumstances by crafting complex and nuanced
causal schemes in order to ultimately prove – or
indeed salvage against countervailing evidence –
the Marxian postulate about the ultimate role of the
economy. Loosening up the causal rigour of a purely
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economic explanation, the strategy was to maintain
the causal primacy of the economy by opening what
was emerging as a black box of causal linkages and
to ﬁnd the speciﬁc feature of capitalism that created
abolitionism.
Yet even these more complex casual schemes
fail to satisfy. If, as Davis argued, Anglo-American
industrialists and merchants joined abolitionism
because of their ideological interest in instiling a
more appropriate wage-based mode of oppression,
why was it that their counterparts in contemporary
France or late 19th-century Catalonia did the exact
opposite and aligned themselves ﬁrmly with the
pro-slavery camp (Fradera 1990; Gauthier 2007;
Maluquer de Motes 1986; Quinney 1970, 1972)? In
other words, Davis’s postulated ideological connec-
tion between capitalism and abolitionism asserted
itself selectively only in the Anglo-American case,
which in itself requires an additional explanation.
Similarly, in a period when in Seymour
Drescher’s (1987, p.20) words, “capitalism pro-
vided the principal motives and the ideological
underpinnings of British Atlantic slavery”, British
slave traders occupied the perfect position that
should have made them – according to Haskel’s
logic – an ilustration of the disciplinary power of
the market to cultivate awareness of consequences
and humanitarianism. In contrast, for example, with
the monopoly exercised by the East India Company
in the Indian Ocean area, the trade with Africa
was open to individual investors, thus approaching
the dream of the free market capitalist. While
the African Company, supported ﬁnancialy by
parliament, maintained the infrastructure of forts
on the West African coast, the proﬁts of the
African trade were accessible after 1750 to anyone
wiling to invest in a trading voyage. In practi-
cal terms, this meant that British entrepreneurs
involved in the slave trade by conducting complex
and geographicaly spread operations in near free-
market conditions, were one of the most sophis-
ticated market operators of their time (Behrendt
2001). They were the ideal market participants
who, according to Haskel, would develop the
preconditions for the new humanitarian sensibility:
a cognitive proclivity for understanding long causal
chains, a habitus of promise-keeping, and belief in
the efﬁcacy of one’s actions.
Yet not a single one among them joined the
abolitionist ranks. It is, of course, possible, although
unlikely, that the market-embedded entrepreneurs
engaged in the slave trade did develop the human-
itarian sensibility hypothesised by Haskel but did
not express it privately or publicly because of an
overiding unconscious wish not to endanger their
proﬁts. The non-expression of such a hypothetical
private conscience is, however, striking in light of
the periodic public struggles over the organisation
of the African trade in which various faction of
African traders publicly debated various organi-
sational alternatives and aired instances of abuses
and coruption (Brown 2007; Keirn 1995; Klinge
1973). The main concern of al participants in these
debates was the maximisation of the volume and
the proﬁt of the trade. Yet not a single time did
the various factions of “African” merchants express
even a ﬂeeting acknowledgment of the sufering
endured by enslaved Africans.
A similar selectivity can be seen at work
among the Quakers, out of whose organisation the
project of abolitionism originated. Both Davis and
Haskel explain the Quakers’ pioneering role in
antislavery with their involvement as merchants and
industrialists in the emergent capitalist market. Yet
decisive for the Quaker turn towards antislavery
was a culture of religious reformism caried out by
a minority of reformers with a relative detachment
from the workings of the market. By contrast,
many of the British Quakers most invested in the
economy, the economicaly successful Quakers of
various trades, adopted the abolitionist programme
under the intense pressure exercised by such
reformers who were able to gradualy overtake the
governance organs of the Society of Friends (Brown
2006). Similarly important in the Quakers’ case was
a tradition of political activism. The smal nucleus
of Quakers who formed the ﬁrst London abolition
commitee were entrepreneurs deeply embedded in
business networks (Jennings 1997). Yet they were
also engaged in the generational conﬂict within
the Society of Friends between older and more
conformist elders and a new cohort of more activist
and socialy conscious entrants in the elite (Brown
2006). One of them, James Philips, was a highly
successful printer and bookseler familiar with the
workings of the market and, indeed, his business
connections served him wel in recruiting adherents
to abolitionism (Jennings 1997; Oldﬁeld 1995,
p.43). Yet he was also the son of early “anti-war”
activist Catherine Philips, the traveling female
Quaker minister who had spoken to members of the
Pennsylvania legislature for cessation of hostility
with Indians in a context when the majority of
white Pennsylvanians clamoured for their 18th-
century equivalent of “war” on Indian “terorists”
(Philips 1797). Again, the inﬂuence of a purely
economic position was remarkably diluted here.
Quakers, some of them indeed embedded deeply
in a capitalist market, engaged in the movement
against the slave trade not because they were
capitalists, but because they were subjected to the
pressure of felow abolitionist reformers who in turn
relied on a long-standing tradition of Quaker activist
intervention in politics.
In short, these accounts of abolitionism result
in a paradox. On the one hand they work rhetoricaly
to reinforce the Marxist intuition that there must
be something in capitalism that produces antislav-
ery. At the same time numerous deviations from
this postulated causal patern appear if one is to
search for an empiricaly testable causal link that
would persuasively show the paramount inﬂuence
of capitalism and economic determination on the
actors of early abolitionism. The ultimate source of
this tension is an implicit “oversocialised” model of
social action where uniform atitudes are assumed
to derive from a single overarching cause, such as
capitalism, with no regard for the al too realistic
possibility of either non-trivial variance in human
responses to a single structural stimulus or multiple
(and thus competing) causal inﬂuences. For while
relaxing the strict parameters of the classic Marxist
model and introducing an intermediate casual factor
such as capitalist or humanitarian ideology, these
authors stil streamline their arguments along one
single deterministic causal arow that, ﬂowing from
the economic structures of capitalism, powerfuly
inﬂuences human behaviour.
Abolitionism in its historical
context
These causal constructs are ﬂawed in an even deeper
sense because they misrepresent the complex rela-
tionship between two, at ﬁrst sight, separate areas
of purposive social action: the area of economic
transactions and the area of moral action. A closer
look at early British abolitionism reveals, however,
the complex relationship between these two areas
and how this complexity arose inevitably from the
fact that the actors of abolitionism were not the
oversocialised humans subjected to the totalising
inﬂuence of capitalism but rather strategic and
moral actors who confronted the economic realities
of their time in a purposive manner.
To unpack this causal complexity it is neces-
sary to consider, in their fulness, both theexplanan-
dumof abolitionism and the putativeexplanans
of the economy. Abolitionism was not simply an
“easy”, sub-revolutionary, ameliorative or purely
humanitarian project but a political and moral
project of economic radicalism that sought suc-
cessfuly to transform the accepted moral calculus
justifying an important part of the British economy.
Nor can the new capitalism of the 18th century
be reduced to a highly stylised realm of purely
economic action driven exclusively by consider-
ations of proﬁtability and efﬁciency. It is only
when we recognise the inherent complexity of both
phenomena that we can evaluate the formative role
of the economy for the rise of abolitionism.
Yet there is no sense in the works of the
Marxist tradition, for example, of the complex
meanings of the British slave trade that for its con-
temporaries, participants and observers alike. The
commercial trading in enslaved Africans – the target
of the abolitionist project – was remarkably modern
economicaly and ﬁt snugly with increasingly “cap-
italist” circuits of production, exchange, and con-
sumption (Curtin 1990; Drescher 2010). The slave
trade was neatly integrated in Atlantic commercial
chains culminating in the delivery and re-export
of highly demanded tropical products, such as the
slave-produced sugar from the Caribbean. It was
based on sophisticated ﬁnancial machinery, such
as bils of exchange and the West India brokerage
houses in London that underwrote commercial
transactions. It was lucrative for domestic investors,
normaly bringing them a stable return of slightly
below 10 per cent. Indirectly, the trade provided
employment for thousands producers throughout
England (Anstey 1975; Checkland 1958; Klein
2010; McCants 2007; Morgan 2007; Porter 1970;
Rawley 2005; Richardson 1987, 1998).
The slave trade was thus an inherently eco-
nomic issue in that it was deeply connected with
the larger economy. Yet, paradoxicaly, precisely
because of its economic salience, the slave trade was
also an inherently moral issue even before the rise
of organised abolitionism in so far as the “African
trade” (of which human cargo was the most prof-
itable “commodity”) formed one of the foci of
ongoing political and moral debates on British
foreign and imperial trade. Consolidating British
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capitalism, as a social formation, was not only
a distinctive conﬁguration of economic relations,
but also a set of heterogeneous and contentious
moral discourses, arguments, and ideologies. In the
context of an imperialy backed expanding foreign
trade, moral polemics in the public sphere and
in parliament constructed the perceived “value”
of speciﬁc branches of that trade competing for
the state and parliament’s atention and resources.
This politicaly constructed value of the trade was,
in turn, increasingly important in an increasingly
complex economic environment where ascertaining
how proﬁtable (and for whom) foreign trading
activities were was an increasingly complex enter-
prise. Multiplying claims of competing economic
groups produced a complex and contentious moral
environment in which political batles over how
exactly economic activities should be organised
infused parliamentary politics and the public sphere
(Bowen 1991; Bowen 2006; Brown 2007; Keirn
1995; Klinge 1973; Lipson 1931; Osborn 2002;
Rawley 2005; Sutherland 1952; Van Aalst 1970).
In the historical context of abolitionism’s
emergence, the economic and the moral spheres
were intertwined in complex ways and it is these
complex interstices of moral struggles over eco-
nomic issues that form the immediate explana-
tory background of abolitionism, not an abstract
“capitalism”. The fact of this intertwining com-
plicates the basic Marxist explanatory plotline in
which the economic environment “pushes” indi-
viduals towards certain thoughts and actions, such
as the antislavery stance. That would have been the
case if the economic area was, a priori, more fun-
damental and causaly stronger than the sphere of
moral reﬂection. Instead, the institutional arange-
ments of the economy were in many ways the result
of political and thus inherently moral struggles.
Potential 18th-century humanitarians were not sim-
ply the passive recipients of the impersonal forces of
the “market”. People in England were surounded,
if not enveloped, by ongoing cultural struggles over
the moral meanings of markets and the economy.
It is impossible, in this context of ongoing
moral debates on the economy, to reduce aboli-
tionism to the expression of a market-produced
humanitarian sensibility, as, for instance, Haskel
atempts to do. The important innovation of the
abolitionist ideological platform was not simply
a new humanitarian focus on the sufering of the
enslaved. The image of the sufering slave – in
the abstract – was at that time a wel-known trope
of sentimental literature (Carey 2005). But the
slave’s condition was considered lamentable and
sympathy-provoking yet natural and inevitable –
especialy when enslaved labour in the colonies
contributed to English economic power. The dis-
tinctive political “move” of early British aboli-
tionism was to insist that the entire market in
enslaved humans be abolished. Thus abolitionism
had an inherent radical dimension that transcended
the parameters of “pure” humanitarianism in two
interelated aspects. It reversed an existing moral
calculus in which the negative “externalities” of
distant enslavement were far outweighed by the
beneﬁts of the slave trade for the English economy
and it demanded the immediate suspension of the
slave trade, not its amelioration on humanitarian
grounds. In addition to its humanitarian concern
with enslaved Africans, abolitionism made two
interconnected and novel claims: that enslavement
was moraly wrong regardless of its economic
beneﬁts; and, therefore, that the trade in enslaved
humans had to be stopped immediately.
A market-generated generalised humanitarian
disposition, however, would have been consistent
with a number of other potential political projects
of changing the parameters of the international
slave trade. Counterfactualy, one could imagine
a vastly diferent target and outcome of the abo-
litionist project: for example, an international legal
regime regulating the slave trade and ensuring some
minimal “rights” to enslaved individuals that would
guarantee them more humane treatment. In fact,
there were several such ameliorative projects of
regulating the slave trade and slavery in 18th-
century Britain (Brown 2006). Yet this is not what
abolitionists envisioned and sought. As Charles
James Fox argued in the ﬁrst parliamentary debate
on the abolition of the slave trade in 1789, to
compromise and just regulate the trade instead
of fuly abolishing it would be the equivalent of
“regulation of robbery and restriction of murder”
(House of Commons 1789b, p.194).
No ideology or disposition directly produced
by capitalism can explain why enslaved Africans –
as opposed to other potential recipients of sympa-
thy – formed such a strong focus of concern. In
retrospect, it is tempting to explain this choice
of humanitarianism’s “target” with the assump-
tion that there must have been something intrin-
sicaly and particularly heinous about slavery that
automaticaly placed it so high on the moral
agenda that it trumped other forms of sufering.
But this is to rewrite history through the lens
of the abolitionist normative framework that by
now has become a commonsense moral intuition.
It was the abolitionist ideology supported by an
activist network that crystalised in the 1780s that
deliberately and successfuly deﬁned commercial
transactions with humans in the role of commodity
as an absolute moral wrong, against prevalent moral
understandings that normalised enslavement was at
best lamentable yet ultimately an indispensable and
taken-for-granted aspect of the economy.
Ilustrative examples of the general tenor of
pre-abolitionist public discussions related to the
British African help highlight the contrast between,
on the one hand, the complacent moral climate
into which abolitionism burst in in the 1780s, and,
on the other hand, the truly radical dimension of
the re-deﬁnition of the slave trade as an absolute
moral wrong in need of immediate eradication. A
propagandist of the slave trade exclaimed in 1745:
.. is it not notorious to the whole World, that the Business
ofPlantingin ourBritish Colonies. . . is caried on by
the Labour ofNegroes, imported thither fromAfrica? Are
we not indebted to those valuable People, theAfricans,for
ourSugars, Tobaccoes, Rice, Rum,and al otherPlantation
Produce?And the greater the Number ofNegroesimported to
ourColonies, fromAfrica,wil not the Exportation ofBritish
Manufactures among theAfricansbe in Proportion; they being
paid for in such Commodities only? The more likewise our
Plantations abound inNegroes, wil not more Land become
cultivated, and bothbeterand greaterVarietyofPlantation
Commoditiesbe produced? As those Trades are subservient to
the Wel Being and Prosperity of each other; so the more either
ﬂourishes or declines, the other must be necessary afected . . .
(Postlethwayt 1745, p.6).
At the very same time he argued that that parlia-
ment’s refusal to compensate the African Com-
pany’s expenses for maintenance of trading forts
in West Africa was a violation of rights that “would
savour so barefacedly of the Tyranny and Oppres-
sion of the most slavish Countries” (Postleth-
wayt 1745). In 1777, a parliamentary petition of
London traders accused the Commitee of the
African Company of encouraging “unjust practices
of certain individuals” who undermined “the trade
for Negroes to that part of the cost where the
best Negroes . . . are mostly to be got” (quoted
in Klinge 1973, p.361). In 1772, Edmund Burke,
who would later cultivate an abolitionist reputation,
defended the African Company by arguing that
under its management the number of “imported”
slaves had increased more than twofold (quoted
in Klinge 1979). As late as 1789, petitions from
Liverpool and Manchester for the preservation of
slave trade in 1789 emphasised the inextricable con-
nection between British production and the demand
of the “African” trade to argue that an abolition
would harm local artisans (House of Commons
1789a). Remarkably innocent of the paralels with
the forced displacement of Africans, the Liverpool
petitioners sought sympathy for “honest Artiﬁcers”
whom abolition would degrade into “solitary Wan-
derers into the World, to seek Employment in
Foreign Climes”.
In other words, before the arival of the abo-
litionist mobilisation, the British slave trade was
considered typicaly as a purely economic or even
“technical” topic and the focus was on its prof-
itability and efﬁciency. There was rarely an expres-
sion of humanitarian concern for the enslaved: the
human beings who were inﬂicted with a signiﬁcant
degree of sufering, degradation, and deprivation of
basic liberties for the purposes of economic ratio-
nality. If there were publicly expressed concerns
about the morality of the slave trade, they were
about the putatively harmful ways in which aspects
of the trade afected the British negatively, whether
the economic welbeing of the “nation” or of
certain groups whose welbeing and rights were
undermined by the institutional arangements of the
trade.
We can ﬁnd the occasional questioning of
the moral foundations of the slave trade, such as
Horace Walpole’s 1750 leter that expresses pas-
sionate yet private disgust with the moral absurdity
of the parliamentary proceedings establishing a new
framework for the African Company:
We have been siting this fortnight on the African Company:
we, the British Senate, the temple of Liberty, and bulwark
of Protestant Christianity, have this fortnight been pondering
methods to make more efectual that horid trafﬁc of seling
negroes [sic]. It has appeared to us that six and forty thousand
of these wretches are sold every year to our plantations
alone! – It chils one’s blood – (Lewiset al.1960, p. 126).
Yet disgusted as Walpole the MP (and other putative
humanitarians at the time) might have been, he did
not rise in the Commons to express a principled
position against the slave trade. Publicly, the trade
only turned into a moral problem in so far as it
afected British interests and examination of the
sufering it caused to the enslaved was relegated to
the occasional private exercise of moral rigour.
The transformation that the rising abolitionist
movement produced consisted thus in a radical
reframing of the entrenched moral evaluation of the
slave trade and in the normalizing of this refram-
ing. From this new perspective, the trade was not
evaluated according to how it beneﬁted or harmed
the proﬁts of its British participants. Instead, abo-
litionism claimed, people in Britain – even those
not connected directly with the economics of the
slave trade – were deeply responsible for the abso-
lute moral wrong of enslavement. It argued that
the trade left an indelible moral stain on the nation,
its government and parliament, al of them com-
plicit in such inhumane and moraly indefensible
economic activity. As an early abolitionist pamphlet
put it, “the revenue of the government, the proﬁts
of the merchants, and the luxury of the people have
involved the whole nation asparticipes criminis”
(Woods 1784, pp.22-23) in the maintenance of
colonial slavery. “As Englishmen, the blood of
the murdered African is upon us, and upon our
children”, exclaimed Thomas Cooper later (1787,
p.28).
In addition to this substantive reversal of the
habitual moral calculus, however, an important
achievement of the abolitionist project was to take
the absolutist moral argument of the wrongness of
slavery from the recesses of private musings into the
public arena. It gradualy yet efectively broadcast
and “normalised” the moral rigour of a minority
that had developed – against the prevailing moral
consensus – a far-reaching conviction that slavery
was an evil to eradicate regardless of economic
considerations. It turned a radical moral claim into
a taken-for-granted commonsensical intuition that
we stil share.
It is impossible to explain the articulation
and adoption of this economic radicalism by any
overarching atitudinal or dispositional factor cre-
ated by the logic of capitalism. Anything but the
ful abolition of the slave trade could have served
humanitarians and capitalists of any hue very wel,
precisely because there were wel established moral
conventions that reconciled the existence of the
perhaps lamentable condition of enslavement with
a thriving and proﬁtable capitalist economy.
In fact, recent work has emphasised the
deeply heterogeneous and networked character of
abolitionist constituencies that grew gradualy by
accretion (Palmer 2009; Stamatov 2013). It is
impossible to deﬁne these constituencies along a
single dimension determined by their economic
position. Corespondingly, it is not realistic to
expect a single causal path that led everyone to
abolitions: the analytical task is to identify the
distinctive motivations behind various individuals’
and networks’ adoption of the abolitionist cause.
What is more, explaining adherence to aboli-
tionism from pre-existing uniform atitudes induced
by capitalism may lead to circular reasoning. Indi-
viduals and groups might have engaged in pro-
abolition activity not because of “deep” dispositions
conditioned by capitalism, but simply because they
engaged in what economists cal “preference falsiﬁ-
cation” (Kuran 1995), that is, the public declaration
of alegedly genuine individual preferences that
are subtly tailored to what is considered socialy
acceptable. To put it simply, many of the signatories
of the public petitions for the abolition of the slave
trade might have given their signature not from
intrinsic conviction but because they adopted the
abolitionist cause under the subtle social pressure
to conform to what they thought were the prevalent
preferences of their peers. Research on how com-
munities at the time transitioned between popular
support of otherwise diametricaly opposed radical
and conservative causes only lends support to the
importance of non-ideological contextual factors
for popular political behaviour (Philp 1995). From
this point of view, the important factor was not
the pre-existing atitudes of the English, but the
fact that the core of abolitionist organisers were
able by various means to recruit a critical mass
of supporters throughout England which, in turn,
increased the social valuation of professed aboli-
tionist preferences. It is quite likely that when they
signed abolitionist petitionsen massethe English
were doing the historical equivalent of the “bucket
chalenge” of yesteryear: they were doing it because
it was the popular thing to do, not because they were
cariers of mindsets created by capitalism.
If there was one characteristic that united the
disparate adherents of early abolitionism even more
strongly than their embeddedness in a changing
economy, it was their basic religious literacy that
made them sensitive to the religious rhetoric of
abolitionism. Central to the abolitionist platform
was the centuries-old “prophetic” trope of a reli-
gious community that needs to amend its ways
lest it sufer God’s wrath. This “Hebraic” fram-
ing of slavery as sin for which the community
has to expiate remained an enduring core of the
abolitionist project from its emergence in mid-
18th-century transatlantic Quaker networks until
much later into the 19th century (Stamatov 2013;
Oldﬁeld and Huzzey 2012). It was one persuasive
way to connect discursively the economic and
the moral and almost imperceptibly introduce a
religious, and thus unassailable, justiﬁcation for
what was after al a rather unusual reform proposal.
To the average English person of 1750 the abolition
of the slave trade must have sounded as outlandish
as the idea of legalised same-sex mariage to the
average American two centuries later – precisely
because the slave trade by that point had been
justiﬁed by moral arguments that discounted the
enslavement of Africans as an acceptable “price”
to pay for British wel-being. The Hebraic trope
of the sinful nation reversed this moral calculus.
The important point, however, is that for contem-
poraries the plausibility of this Hebraic framing
did not require any distinctive atitude produced
by capitalism, but just the basic biblical literacy that
was the only universal trait shared by al inhabitants
of the British Isles at the time.
In other words, early abolitionism is best
understood as arising from the complex inter-
play of a variety of factors that include cultural
framings that resonated with contemporaries and
the autonomous dynamics of successful colective
mobilisation. In itself, the economy, understood
as a set of proﬁt-oriented practices and structures,
gives us no analytical leverage in understanding the
origins of abolitionist economic radicalism or in
answering the question why the abolitionist norm
was adopted by a signiﬁcant number of people.
There is simply no plausible way to derive the
distinctive salient features of the abolitions project
directly or indirectly from economic structures. The
pathways through which a distinctively “humanitar-
ian” linkage between the economic and moral were
created and disseminated were multiple and com-
plex. They did not presuppose a single atitudinal
disposition created by the rise of capitalism.
Refocusing humanitarianism
The deep question opened by the scholarly debate
on the origins of abolitionism and antislavery is
the precise nature of the connection between the
economic and moral dimensions of human action.
In practice, these two dimensions are inextricably
connected: humans seek both material advantages
and moral certainty. The analytical chalenge then
is to specify how they intersect to exercise causal
inﬂuence on cognitions and actions. The general
problem of the Marxist tradition in explaining
abolitionism is its reliance on a convenient yet
reductionist analytical shortcut: instead of explor-
ing the complex intersections between the logics of
the economic and the moral this tradition takes it
for granted that capitalism and the economy form
the bedrock structure that ultimately conditions and
steers the moral dimension of action.
The historical irony in al this is that the
scholarly tradition of economic derivatism was built
on the shaky foundations of an eror of Marx’s.
The presumably economicaly inefﬁcient and pre-
modern nature of slavery was an ideological trope,
and thus inherently a moral statement, that the
abolitionist project used in order to justify its
goal, the abolition of slavery. It was at odds with
economic and social facts: colonial slavery and the
slave trade were generaly highly proﬁtable before
their abolition; for the owner, the enslaved body had
the double economic advantage of being capital and
source of labour at the same time; in many setings
slavery was compatible with industrial modes of
production; and there is no indication that slavery
was the predominant “ancient” mode of oppression
(Drescher 2010; Fredrickson 1981; Price 1991;
Starobin 1968; Wickham 1994). Yet Marx took this
inherently moral statement and casualy elevated it
into an abstract principle of factual historical devel-
opment. He mistook abolitionist rhetoric and the
outcome of abolitionist action for the impersonal
workings of large historical forces.
Colonial slavery, however, was not abolished
because the impersonal forces of industrial capi-
talism did not need it. It was abolished because
of temporaly enduring and geographicaly spread
waves of mobilisation that purposefuly targeted its
end (Drescher 2009). Within this larger and endur-
ing abolitionist cycle of mobilisations, the early
abolition campaigns in late 18th-century Britain
were a critical event that built the initial base of
later global abolitionisms.
Seen in this light, early abolitionism as a
formative event in the history of global human-
itarianism was a social phenomenon that exer-
cised causal inﬂuences on its own. It did not
produce the totalising efect of a “revolution” in
Marx’s eschatological sense. Yet it was an important
step towards the transformation of global moral-
ity by successfuly introducing a “prohibitive”
regime against the enslavement of human beings
(Nadelmann 1990). In other words, it gives its stu-
dents strong reasons to leave behind the preconcep-
tions of the Marxian legacy that sees abolitionism
and humanitarianism as inherently derivative and
thus sociologicaly uninteresting phenomena.
This is where the examination of the origins of
abolitionism is suggestive for the study of human-
itarianism in general. The clearest conclusion of
the examination of these origins is the importance
of a pervasive and ireducible moral dimension of
the early abolitionist project with its focus on the
complete ending of the slave trade as an absolute
moral wrong. Abolitionism deﬁned the condition
of human enslaved as moraly indefensible and –
after a series of complex interactions – transformed
the global moral landscape. This moral dimension
cannot be explained as deriving from the logic of
economic transformations.
Recognising, analyticaly, the strong moral
dimension of the abolitionist project, or any
humanitarian project, does not mean its normative
endorsement. A discussion of the inherent “right-
ness” of a moral norm and a moral conviction, while
a legitimate endeavour, is beyond the scope of a
sustained discussion of the analytical dimensions of
humanitarianism’s origin. Yet students and critics
of humanitarianism wil be wel served by more
focused atention to the inherently moral aspects
of humanitarian projects, institutions, and practices
in history and today. In that, they can count on
the insights of scholars of social movements and
international relations who in their own ways have
highlighted the analytical importance of the moral
dimension (Jasper 1997; Finnemore 1996).
My discussion shows that abolitionism stood
in a complex, entangled, and antagonistic rela-
tionship with the economy. There is a twofold
methodological lesson here: despite the instincts
of the Marxian legacy, abolitionism was a causaly
signiﬁcant, non-derivative phenomenon that needs,
ﬁrst, to be studied and understood in its complexity
and, second, to be situated in a complex causal con-
text. Extrapolated onto the wider ﬁeld of humanitar-
ianism in history, these two lessons cal, ﬁrst, for a
beter understanding of humanitarianism in the ful
variety and complexity of its manifestations and,
second, for careful speciﬁcation of the casual con-
nections between existing humanitarianisms and
other institutional spheres in various national and
supranational arenas.
There is ample ground for a basic taxonomic
and deﬁnitional work in the study of humanitarian-
ism. What are the various forms of humanitarianism
andhowaretheybestdeﬁned(Wilkinsoninthis
issue)? Even in an early manifestation, such as
18th-century British abolitionism, humanitarianism
manifested itself in a variety of practices. Abo-
litionism had a distinctly political dimension in
mobilising public opinion for pressure on parlia-
ment; it initiated economic projects for “alternative
development” in Africa of economic activities to
substitute the trading in human beings; and it
developed a culture of selective consumption in
Britain of “free produce” sugar and coton, thus
preﬁguring contemporary practices of “fair trade”.
Al these are related yet analyticaly distinct forms
of humanitarian practice. The usual image of con-
temporary humanitarianism – partly the result of
the visual propaganda of humanitarian agencies
in a highly saturated market – is the seemingly
apolitical narative of aiding distant individuals
sufering the consequence of catastrophic events.
Yet even more so than in the 18th century, the global
institutional ﬁeld of humanitarianism is rich and
complex. A ﬁrst step of making humanitarianism
sociologicaly interesting and rescuing it from the
limiting assumptions of its derivative character
involves sharper atention to the various organisa-
tional forms that constitute the humanitarian ﬁeld
today.
The historical dynamics of early British abo-
litionism cannot be ﬁted into an economicaly
deterministic frame of explanation. The claim of
the overwhelming causal efects of the economy
is rather the scholarly elaboration of unwaranted
assumptions made in the 19th century. What does
this say about more recent statements about the
subservient role of humanitarianism to capitalism
(Chimni 2004; Donini 2010)? While it is quite
possible that the causal force of the economy has
increased remarkably in the recent past, this is a
claim that needs to be proved, not taken for granted.
Be that as it may, the lesson from the study of
early abolitionism is that regardless of the exact
nature of its relation with other spheres of society,
humanitarianism has exercised causal efects on its
own. The recognition of this fact opens up the
possibility of exploring these causal efects and
enriching the agenda of humanitarianism studies,
especialy if scholars venture to study the interface
of humanitarianism with other institutional areas.
What, for example, have been the efects of human-
itarianism on concrete social phenomena such as
labour, immigration, and social policies? More gen-
eraly, how has humanitarianism contributed to the
long-term process of normative and moral change?
These are the kind of analyticaly fruitful questions
that a careful examination of early abolitionism
brings to our atention.
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